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CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
THE PRIVATE SECTOR: THE CASE
OF THE RESOURCE AMENDMENT
By ROBERT D. CAIRNS,* MARSHA A. CHANDLER,** WILLIAM D. MouLL***
The 1982 resource amendment to the Constitution, section 92A, has been analysed
primarily from the perspective of its impact on intergovernmental relations in the
formation of resource policies Yet the fundamenta constitutional 'rules of the game'
may also affect the ongoing relationship between governments and private-sector
resource participants In this article, the authors discuss how section 92A might affect
that relationship in terms both of the policy-making process and of the substance
of the resultant policiem
L INTRODUCTION
The recent changes in Canada's Constitution have been extensively
analysed from both legal and political perspectives. So far, most of the
commentary has focused on the implications of constitutional change
for intergovernmental relations and on the limitations on government
powers that flow from entrenchment of individual rights under the
Charter.2 This has been particularly so in the case of the resource
amendment contained in section 92A of the Constitution3 where the bulk
of the analysis has centred on relationships in the public sector. Indeed,
in an earlier paper4 we ourselves explored the impact of section 92A
on Canadian federalism. However, there is little question that the
prevailing constitutional arrangements also form the fundamental rules
@ Copyright, 1986, Robert D. Cairns, Marsha A. Chandler, and William D. Moull.
* Associate Professor, Department of Economics and Centre for the Study of Regulated
Industries, McGill University.
** Professor, Department of Political Science and Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
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The authors would like to acknowledge support received from the Institute for Research on
Public Policy during earlier research conducted on section 92A.
I Constitution Ac 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
2 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Ac4 1982, ibir
3 Supra, note 1, Part VI, ss 50, 51.
4 R.D. Cairns, M.A. Chandler & W.D. Moull, "The Resource Amendment (Section 92A) and
the Political Economy of Canadian Federalism" (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall LJ. 253.
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of the game for the private sector. Thus, any major change in the
intergovernmental dynamic will have consequences for the public-private
nexus. The purpose of this paper is to consider the effects of the
constitutional revisions contained in section 92A on the relationship
between governments and the resource industry.
To do this it is first necessary for us to spell out the formal changes
in the Constitution and to indicate the likely legal implications of the
new constitutional arrangements for the private sector. The focus of the
paper then shifts to the possible policy impact of section 92A. The first
element in examining its direct consequences for industry is the effect
it may have on the process of policy making. Will the constitutional
changes lead to alterations in the modes of consultation and negotiation
between government and business? Operating under section 92A, will
the resource industry be more removed from the policy process, or will
the new arrangements portend greater access for industry? The second
question here is the possible effect on policy substance. Does section
92A suggest that there may be greater government intervention in the
resource sector? Are the instruments of resource policy used by govern-
ments likely to change? In conclusion, we will offer some thoughts on
how the ongoing relationships between governments and the resource
industry may develop under section 92A.
II. THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
The resource amendment, contained in section 92A of the Con-
stitution, has altered the face of provincial legislative powers in relation
to natural resources. In a formal sense, in the context of the division
of the complete range of legislative powers in Canada between the federal
and provincial orders of government, section 92A has shifted the balance
more toward the provincial side by augmenting provincial powers to
raise revenues from resources and to regulate their development and
production. At the same time, however, the pre-existing legislative powers
of Parliament have not been diminished by section 92A. Overall, section
92A has strengthened the role of the producing provinces as resource
administrators, but not at the expense of the prior role of the federal
government.
In so doing, section 92A has gone a long way toward overcoming
the legislative incapacities of the provinces that resulted from the decisions
of the Supreme Court of Canada in CIGOL5 and Central Canada Potash6
5 Canadian Industnial Gas & Oil Ltd v. Government of Saskatchewan (1978), [1979] 1 S.C.R.
37, 80 D.L.R. (3d) 449 [hereinafter CIGOL].
6 Central Canada Potash Co. Ltd v. Government of Saskatchewan (1979), [1979] 1 S.C.R.
42, 88 D.L.R. (3d) 609 [hereinafter Central Canada Potash].
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in the late 1970s. Both of those decisions resulted from private sector
challenges to legislative initiatives of the province of Saskatchewan -
to its regime for capturing windfall oil profits in CIGOL, and to its potash
prorationing scheme in Central Canada Potash. In both instances, the
legal result turned upon the Supreme Court's perceptions of the pre-
92A balance of formal federal-provincial legislative powers. At the same
time, however, in both cases the protagonists were a provincial government
on the one side and a private sector challenger on the other.7 The
battleground in each case was the scope of a province's legislative powers
in relation to natural resources; but the battles were waged between the
province and the private sector.
However, in strengthening the formal role of the provinces as resource
managers through the removal of some of the barriers to the exercise
of legislative power erected by CIGOL and Central Canada Potash, section
92A does not really give any clear indication of whether the new legislative
powers it confers on the provinces will be used by them or of the manner
in which they will be used. It may be that possession of legislative power
tempts its use; but other considerations, such as prevailing economic
conditions and the political philosophies of provincial governments over
time, will likely be the key factors in determining the extent to which
provincial legislatures resort to their powers under section 92A. As well,
several of the provisions of section 92A contain sufficient interpretive
uncertainties to make it difficult to predict just how far the boundaries
of provincial legislative authority have been extended and thus how far
a province may be able to move if it feels inclined to do so. This is
particularly so in the case of the resource-management powers set out
in subsections 92A(1) and (2).
Subsection 92A(1) deals with provincial legislative powers in relation
to resources within the province. It provides as follows:
(1) In each province, the legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to
(a) exploration for non-renewable natural resources in the province;
(b) development, conservation and management of non-renewable natural
resources and forestry resources in the province, including laws in relation
to the rate of primary production therefrom; and
(c) development, conservation and management of sites and facilities in the
province for the generation and production of electrical energy.
The list of legislative powers set out in subsection 92A(1) seems
comprehensive with respect to the resource-related activities it mentions.
7 The federal government did join in the Central Canada Potash litigation as a co-plaintiff
after the action had been commenced. See, however, W.D. Moull, "Natural Resources: The Other
Crisis in Canadian Federalism" (1980) 18 Osgoode Hall W. 1 at 29.
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All phases of resource development seem to be covered, from preliminary
exploration stages through the placement of development facilities to
the production stage itself. In respect of forestry resources and non-
renewable natural resources, such as minerals and hydrocarbons, pro-
vincial jurisdiction specifically encompasses laws in relation to their rate
of primary production. It is hard to see any material aspect of the
development of resources within a province that is absent from the listing
in subsection 92A(1).
Before section 92A, of course, the producing provinces exercised
resource-management powers under section 92(5) of the Constitution in
respect of provincially owned Crown lands, which are the property of
the provinces under section 109 of the Constitution.8 As well, most -
if not all - of the resource-related activities mentioned in subsection
92A(1) likely fell within the general legislative powers of the provinces
under section 92; but section 92 does not specifically refer to resources
(except for section 92(5), which is confined to Crown-owned resources),
so those prior provincial powers arose by implication under other, less
explicit, heads of provincial jurisdiction (such as that in section 92(13)
in relation to "property and civil rights" within the province). Subsection
92A(1) has, at the very least, confirmed provincial resource-management
powers within the province - powers that can be exercised as a matter
of general legislative authority and not as a subspecies of the rights flowing
from provincial Crown ownership - by expressly entrenching those
powers in the Constitution.
The principal difficulty in interpreting the effect of subsection 92A(1)
lies not so much in the scope of the resource-related activities it mentions,
as those seem reasonably clear. Rather, the difficulty lies in the scope
of the powers conferred in relation to those activities and especially in
the purposes and objectives for which they may be used. In the Central
Canada Potash decision, for example, the Supreme Court struck down
Saskatchewan's potash prorationing scheme on the ground that it was
really intended by the province to affect the extraprovincial market in
Saskatchewan potash. As an extraprovincial marketing scheme, it in-
fringed upon the exclusive authority of Parliament in relation to inter-
provincial and international trade and commerce under section 91(2)
of the Constitution. The Court reached this conclusion despite the fact
that the principal mechanism through which the scheme operated was
8 Those powers are expressly preserved by subsection 92A(6), as are all other prior provincial
powers and rights.
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a closely regulated regime of controls on the rate of production of potash
within Saskatchewan.9
Under subsection 92A(l), and despite the fact that provincial
legislative jurisdiction now expressly includes laws in relation to resource
production rates, it seems likely that precisely the same result would
be reached if the courts were to conclude that the principal provincial
objective underlying a legislated scheme is extraterritorial. The powers
conferred by subsection 92A(1) are expressly confined to resource-related
activities "in the province," so that those powers must be exercised only
through mechanisms and for purposes that are restricted to the boundaries
of the province in question. They cannot be used to infringe upon the
extraprovincial legislative powers, particularly those in respect of extra-
provincial trade and commerce, which are retained by Parliament.
That is not the end of the matter, however, for subsection 92A(2)
now does confer some authority on the producing provinces in relation
to the extraprovincial marketing of resource production. It provides as
follows:
(2) In each province, the legislature may make laws in relation to the export
from the province to another part of Canada of the primary production from
non-renewable natural resources and forestry resources in the province and the
production from facilities in the province for the generation of electrical energy,
but such laws may not authorize or provide for discrimination in prices or in
supplies exported to another part of Canada.
The new provincial jurisdiction under subsection 92A(2) is not open-
ended, as is evident from its terms. In the first place, it can be exercised
only in respect of the export of resource production "to another part
of Canada" - it cannot be used when resource production is also to
be exported from Canada (as was the case in Central Canada Potash).
Second, the proviso at the end of the subsection will prevent provincial
"export" laws from operating in a discriminatory fashion. The language
of that proviso is hardly a model of clarity. When read at its broadest,
it may mean that a producing province cannot adopt a regime that would
have the effect of favouring local use and consumption of locally produced
resources by discriminating either in prices (a lower price, or price rebate,
for local use or consumption) or in supplies (requiring that local needs
be satisfied before allowing any exports). A narrower reading of the
proviso would permit a producing province to discriminate, either in prices
9 The scheme also included a price-fixing element, which, while not the heart of the regime,
certainly helped the Court in characterizing it as a marketing scheme with its principal effect
outside Saskatchewan. However, given its view of the provincial motivation in imposing the scheme,
it seems likely that the Court would have reached the same conclusion even in the absence of
that price-fixing element. See Moull, supra, note 7 at 27-39. See also W.D. Moull, "Section 92A
of the Constitution Act, 1867" (1983) 61 Can. B. Rev. 715 at 730-31.
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or in supplies, as between itself and the rest of Canada so long as it
did not attempt to pick and choose among the other components of
the Canadian federation. When the courts come to consider its meaning,
it may even be that the proper interpretation of the proviso will fall
somewhere between these two extremes, perhaps with self-favouring price
discrimination being prohibited but self-favouring supply discrimination
being allowed.'0
The third constraint upon provincial legislative powers under sub-
section 92A(2) arises from the express preservation of federal para-
mountcy in subsection 92A(3), which reads as follows:
(3) Nothing in subsection (2) derogates from the authority of Parliament to enact
laws in relation to the matters referred to in that subsection and, where such a
law of Parliament and a law of a province conflict, the law of Parliament prevails
to the extent of the conflict.
Traditional judicially developed theories of federal legislative pa-
ramountcy probably would have reached the same conclusion as that
made express in subsection 92A(3). Since subsection 92A(2) does not
purport to confer any 'exclusive' legislative powers on the provinces,
it is unlikely that the courts would have seen those powers as derogating
from any pre-existing authority of Parliament (notably the trade and
commerce power but including any others as well); and when otherwise
valid federal and provincial legislative measures conflict, to the extent
that the subject cannot comply with one without violating the other,
the judicial theories of federal paramountcy always render the provincial
enactment inoperative to the extent of the conflict."
While federal jurisdiction and paramountcy are expressly preserved
by subsection 92A(3), it is equally clear that subsection 92A(2) represents
an expansion of provincial legislativejurisdiction into a formerly forbidden
field - the regulation of interprovincial marketing of resource production.
For the first time, the producing provinces will be able to exercise a
legislative jurisdiction to control exports of resource production from
the province so long as the legislation is not discriminatory (in whatever
sense of the non-discrimination proviso the courts eventually settle upon),
is confined in its principal impact to exports to other parts of Canada,
and does not run afoul of any overriding federal legislation. That
10 A reading along these lines is supported by the French version of the subsection (which
is equally authoritative). There, the language of the proviso is divided somewhat more clearly into
two types of discrimination: "discrimination in prices" ("des disparits de prix") and "discrimination
in supplies exported to another part of Canada" ("des disparits dans les exportations destindes t
une autre parde du Canada").
11 See, for instance, the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Multiple Access Lid
v. McCutcheon (1982), [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161, 138 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
[VOL 24 No. 2
Constitutional Change and the Private Sector
jurisdiction can be exercised in respect of the production of electrical
energy in the province and in respect of the "primary production" from
forestry and non-renewable natural resources in the province.12
However, whether - and how - that jurisdiction will be exercised
by the provinces is far from clear at the moment. The resource-
management powers in subsections 92A(1) and (2) have not been used
as yet - at least, no new legislation has appeared that is ostensibly
grounded in either provision. Current economic conditions do not seem
to favour close regulation of the resource sector, and the prevailing political
philosophies in the western provinces (such as the Saskatchewan Con-
servatives' 'open-for-business' theme since their election in April 1982)
seem inimical to the pro-active style of resource management that was
more common in the 1970s. It seems more likely that the powers set
out in subsections 92A(1) and (2) will be reserved for reactive use in
some future time of perceived crisis, either in some further conflict over
resources with the federal government (as, for example, when the current
federal-provincial energy agreements expire at the end of 1986) or when
a provincial government believes that the private sector is unable or
unwilling to respond to market conditions in the desired way (as in the
prelude to Saskatchewan's imposition of potash prorationing in 1969).
The revenue-raising aspect of section 92A promises a greater degree
of provincial legislative activity. In CIGOL, the Supreme Court of Canada
struck down a measure enacted by Saskatchewan in an attempt to capture
for itself the windfall profits it saw accruing to the private sector as
a result of the 1973 Arab oil crisis. The Supreme Court concluded that
the measure was an indirect tax borne primarily by purchasers of
Saskatchewan oil outside the province and thus violated section 92(2)
of the Constitution, which limits the provinces to "direct taxation" levied
"within the province." Moreover, the Court said that Saskatchewan's
measure intruded upon the federal trade and commerce power under
section 91(2) because it was an "export" tax intended, at least in part,
to affect the price of Saskatchewan oil in extraprovincial markets.
Subsection 92A(4) has reduced most of the fetters on provincial
resource taxation powers flowing from CIGOL. It reads as follows:
12 In the new Sixth Schedule to the Constitution, which was added by subsection 92A(5),
the "primary" production from forestry and non-renewable natural resources is defined in such
a way as to include, not only raw resource products, but also any processed or refined products
short of the manufacturing stage (except in the case of crude oil and certain of its equivalents,
where the product ceases to be "primary" as soon as it is refined). However, this extended definition
of "primary" production is not likely to carry great significance for the western producing provinces,
for, at the moment, most processing and refining activities to which it might apply take place
elsewhere.
1987]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
(4) In each province, the legislature may make laws in relation to the raising
of money by any mode or system of taxation in respect of
(a) non-renewable natural resources and forestry resources in the province
and the primary production therefrom, and
(b) sites and facilities in the province for the generation of electrical energy
and the production therefrom,
whether or not such production is exported in whole or in part from the province,
but such laws may not authorize or provide for taxation that differentiates
between production exported to another part of Canada and production not
exported from the province.
The time-honoured distinction between direct and indirect taxation
is clearly gone from the resource field. As is the case with the federal
taxation power under section 91(3) of the Constitution, the producing
provinces will now be able to impose "any mode or system of taxation"
upon resources and resource production within the province. Since they
may do so whether or not the taxed production "is exported in whole
or in part from the province," it will no longer be of concern that someone
outside the province might ultimately bear the burden of the tax in the
form of higher prices.
The provincial inability to impose an "export" tax, however, remains
under subsection 92A(4).13 That is clearly the case under the subsection
itself in respect to production exported to another part of Canada, since
a provincial tax regime is expressly prohibited from differentiating between
that production and production not exported from the province. It is
also likely the case in respect of any production exported from Canada
as well as from the producing province. If a provincial measure that
was in form "taxation" purported to differentiate in any material respect
in relation to production destined for international markets (such as by
taxing that production alone, or taxing it at higher rates than applied
to other production used or consumed in Canada), then the courts probably
would see the scheme as being, in substance, something other than true
"taxation." In all likelihood, it would then be categorized as "export"
legislation beyond the bounds even of subsection 92A(2); but in any
case it would not be "taxation" legislation authorized by subsection
92A(4).
Aside from this qualification, however, subsection 92A(4) will now
give the producing provinces added flexibility in designing resource
revenue-raising measures. They will now be able to choose from among
a full range of both direct and indirect tax regimes, including combinations
13 In addition to CIGOL, provincial "export" taxes (including combined tax-plus-rebate schemes)
were struck down by the courts in Attorney General for British Columbia v. McDonald Murphy
Lumber Co. (1930), [1930] A.C. 357, [1930] 2 D.L.R. 721 (P.C.) and in Texada Mines Ltd v.
Attorney General for British Columbia (1960), [1960] S.C.R. 713,24 D.L.R. (2d) 81.
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of the two that were not possible in days before section 92A when an
element of indirectness could taint an otherwise valid direct tax. As a
result, provincial resource taxation measures can now be designed in
ways that parallel the Crown royalty regimes that have been adopted
for production from provincially-owned Crown lands (and for which the
direct-indirect distinction was never relevant because of the different
source of their constitutional authority - provincial Crown proprietary
rights under section 109). In fact, the formerly crucial distinction between
Crown royalties and taxation may ultimately wither away in practical
terms if the flexibility of subsection 92A(4) is exploited to the fullest.
At the very least, even if the provinces wish to maintain the distinction
for legal and symbolic purposes, parallel royalty and taxation systems
can be designed by the provinces in such a way that they are virtually
indistinguishable from each other and thus, for administrative purposes,
can operate essentially as one system.
Saskatchewan has already taken some steps in this regard. Effective
1 January 1983, the government replaced the complex tax regime adopted
for freehold oil production after the CIGOL decision 14 with a new statute
imposing an indirect commodity tax on freehold oil production 15 that
is identical, in its essentials, with the pre-existing Crown oil royalty
system.' 6 Effective 1 January 1984, it also enacted a new mineral taxation
regime 17 that, when compared with its predecessor, 18 promises at least
the opportunity for further simplification of the province's revenue-raising
system. No other province has followed Saskatchewan's lead as yet. Given
that a move from direct to indirect resource taxation can enhance the
conceptual and administrative simplicity of a provincial revenue-raising
system for any particular resource and that such a move entails far fewer
elements of political philosophy than might a move towards greater use
of the resource-management powers in subsections 92A(1) and (2), it
is probable that other provincial governments will follow suit in the future.
Subsection 92A(4) seems likely to engender more provincial legis-
lative initiatives than will subsections 92A(1) and (2). There is still nothing,
however, in subsection 92A(4) that indicates what, if any, effect its
14 The Oil Well Income Tax Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. 0-3.1 (Supp.).
15 The Freehold Oil and Gas Production Tax Act, S.S. 1982-83, c. F-22.1.
16 Compare The Freehold Oil and Gas Production Tax Regulations, 1983, R.R.S. c. F-19, Reg.
142, ss 201-203, with The Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulations 1969, Sask. Reg. 8/69, s. 58.
For further elaboration on this point, see W.D. Moull, "Mineral Taxation in Saskatchewan under
the New Constitution" in R.H. Bartlett, ed., Mining Law in Canada (Saskatoon: Law Society of
Saskatchewan, 1984) 221 at 229-30.
17 The Mineral Taxation Act 1983, S.S. 1983-84, c. M-17.1.
18 The Mineral Taxation Ac4 1978, R.S.S. c. M-17.
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provisions may have on overall resource tax burdens in a province or
on the level of the provincial share of resource revenues. Direct taxes
can be set at low levels, indirect taxes at high levels - and vice versa.
Provincial political philosophies and responses to economic conditions
from time to time - not section 92A - will determine the future course
of provincial resource tax policies. What section 92A has done is to
remove a legal barrier formerly imposed by the Constitution on the
implementation of these policies.
In the end, then, section 92A furnishes the producing provinces with
additional legal shelter for their resource policies, whether in relation
to resource revenue raising or resource management. Even if the new
powers conferred on the provinces by section 92A are not used extensively
and expressly, their enactment has reduced the chance of a successful
private sector challenge to a given policy initiative to the same extent
that section 92A has enhanced provincial legislative powers. Provincial
government-private sector resource litigation is not likely to disappear
entirely, since section 92A has many rough edges that may require judicial
smoothing in the future. The scope for successful challenge, however,
has been reduced considerably from what it was in the days of CIGOL
and Central Canada Potash, and so has the opportunity for the private
sector to play the litigation bargaining chip in its future dealings with
provincial governments.
III. DIRECT POLICY CONSEQUENCES
On its face, section 92A neither specifies the nature of the policy-
making process that will prevail thereunder, nor mandates any particular
policy outcomes. The direct implications of the resource amendment for
the private sector may thus appear uncertain. However, it is still possible
to discern several consequences concerning natural resources that are
of significance to the industry in its relationship with governments.
Section 92A does not purport to resolve many crucial areas of policy
disagreement. Thus, the amendment leaves the management of these
conflicts to other mechanisms, particularly ongoing 'nothing is forever'
intergovernmental agreements rather than the more permanent, less
flexible, and more difficult to achieve 'once and for all settlements'
represented by constitutional amendments.' 9 The Western Accord (1985)
and the Atlantic Accord (1985) are examples of policy-making instruments
of this kind, which go beyond previous intergovernmental agreements.
19 On the differences between these two modes, see J.S. Duprd, "Reflections on the Workability
of Executive Federalism" in R. Simeon, ed., Intergovernmental Relations, vol. 63 (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1985) 1.
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These accords provide a modusoperandi that is at once more flexible
than a constitutional amendment and yet, at the same time, more stable
and indeed more binding than a simple administrative agreement.20 What
has emerged since the passage of section 92A has been greater fed-
eral-provincial cooperation. These accords, as well as the ongoing natural
gas pricing agreements, are reflective of a mutual acceptance of the
existence of legitimate, if not always coincident, concerns on both federal
and provincial sides.
This arrangement of negotiating stable federal-provincial agreements
seems important on two counts for the private sector. First, it provides
a long sought-after degree of certainty for industry.21 It commits both
levels of government to a particular set of arrangements for a finite
period of time and makes unilaterally determined surprises by one
government or the other less likely. Second, it provides a clear point
of access for the industry, which will now be able to make its preferences
known to both orders of government as they make their way to the
bargaining table.
The apparent enhancement of concurrent provincial powers over
resources under section 92A cannot, however, be translated automatically
into policy gains for the industry. Greater concurrency still means that,
as in the past, producers must be ready to press their influence upon
the level of government where they will get the more sympathetic
hearing.22 The strengthening of provincial legislative powers and the
resultant greater concurrency of resource jurisdiction makes either level
of government a potential focus for industry influence.
Increased provincial powers over interprovincial trade and all forms
of resource taxation have, at the same time, reduced the opportunity
for private interests to challenge provincial legislation in the courts (as
occurred in the Central Canada Potash and CIGOL cases).2 3 Finding it
more difficult to use the judicial route to counter provincial regulation
and taxation, the industry will be found to depend even more on the
20 For a discussion of the place of "Accords" in Canada's division of powers, see Report
of The Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, vol. 3
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1985) (Chair D.S. Macdonald) at 256-58.
21 In his analysis of the submission of the mining industry to the Macdonald Commission,
David Yudelman argues that uncertainty with regard to government intervention was deemed a
crucial problem by the industry. See D. Yudelman, Mining and the Macdonald Commisrion: The
State of the Industry in the Mid-1980s (Kingston: Centre for Resource Studies, Queen's University,
1985).
22 See G. Stevenson, Unfuifilled Union (Toronto: MacMillan, 1979).
23 This is not to suggest that there are not ambiguities in section 92A or that there are not
constitutional limits on provincial powers thereunder. Both exist, of course, and the courts may
have to address them in the future; but the overall scope for judicial review of provincial resource
legislation has clearly been reduced.
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political process in order to pursue its interests. The conflicts at the political
bargaining table are less likely to be focused on jurisdictional issues
as they were in the past. The likelihood of policy being determined by
political bargaining rather than by the courts is reinforced by recent
experiences in which, even with apparent legal authority, the federal
government was unwilling to proceed without the cooperation of the
producing provinces. The management of offshore resources and natural
gas pricing are two important examples of Ottawa seeking provincial
agreement in areas for which there was clear federal legislative juris-
diction.24 In sum, the constitutional changes in provincial powers over
non-renewable natural resources make it less likely that private interests
can reach for the judicial lever in attempting to influence policy outcomes.
The extent of the eventual exercise of provincial powers over natural
resources is not determined by section 92A itself, or indeed by any other
part of the Constitution. As Peter Russell has pointed out, "[T]he level
of a government's activity in a given field of policy depends less on
its constitutional resources than on its will to use the resources it has."25
Political will and subsequent policy making are conditioned by a variety
of factors, including current ideology and prevailing economic conditions
as well as forces outside the particular policy field.26
However, section 92A has furnished provincial governments with
a wider range of policy instruments. The provinces will now be better
able to tailor their regulatory, tax, and incentive schemes to their own
perceived needs. The availability of indirect resource taxation measures
under subsection 92A(4) is an important advance for the provinces in
this respect. This increased opportunity for precision may also help the
provinces to avoid inadvertent secondary effects that may be to the
disadvantage of private firms or individuals.
One of the important changes in this regard, particularly in the western
provinces, is that, for purposes of resource management and resource
taxation, the constitutional distinction between Crown and freehold lands
has been blurred. Formerly, the provinces had substantially fewer con-
stitutional powers in respect of freehold lands. Fiscal and regulatory
regimes had to be established to reflect this fact. By treating the two
24 M.A. Chandler, "Constitutional Change and Public Policy" (1986) 19 Can. J. Pol. Sei.
103.
25 P.H. Russell, "The Supreme Court and Federal-Provincial Relations: The Political Use of
Legal Resources" (1985) 11 Can. Pub. Pol. 161 at 165.
26 There are several excellent analyses of political will in the resource sector. See, for example,
G.B. Doern & G. Toner, The Politics of Energy: the Development and Implinentation of the NEP
(Toronto: Methuen, 1985), and J. MacDougall, "Natural Resources and National Politics: A Look
at Three Canadian Resource Industries" in G.B. Doern, ed., The Politics of Economic Policy, vol.
40 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 103.
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more symmetrically, section 92A permits the provinces to have a more
consistent policy for the two types of land holding. This consistency could
be achieved either by a total merger of the regimes for the two types
of lands or by designing parallel regimes for the two, thereby retaining
the separate identity of a province's Crown lands for symbolic or other
reasons. The resulting opportunity for simplification of the provincial
tax and regulatory regimes, if pursued, should have the beneficial effect
on the private sector of reducing the costs of compliance with often
complex tax and regulatory measures.
Because the provinces have greater fiscal and regulatory authority
grounded in legislative powers, there may be a somewhat diminished
incentive to use the Crown corporation as a means of effecting policy
objectives. For example, the creation of the Potash Corporation of
Saskatchewan was partly a response to the provincial government's
inability to control the development of the potash industry under the
old constitutional provisions. This, however, is a difficult incentive to
evaluate because of the many motives, ideology among them, involved
in the establishment of Crown corporations.27 Once again, other, more
concrete considerations may outweigh constitutional abstractions in the
choice of policy instruments.
IV. THE RESOURCE INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT IN THE
EIGHTIES
In our earlier paper, we concluded that section 92A was part of
a new stage in federal-provincial resource relations. We said that: "The
amendment provides a revised framework for the management of conflict
that acknowledges the legitimate interests of both federal and provincial
governments in resource development." 28 In the immediately preceding
section of this paper, we examined the prospects for direct policy
consequences under section 92A for the resource sector. Beyond that,
however, does the change in federal-provincial relationships under section
92A indirectly imply changes in the industry-government relationship
as well?
Historically, both levels of government maintained a relatively minor
role in natural resource management, confined to encouraging private
sector development. There were, typically, few major differences of
opinion between government departments and the private sector regarding
27 See MJ. Trebilcock & J.IS. Prichard, "Crown Corporation: The Calculus of Instrument
Choice" in J.R.S. Prichard, ed., Crown Corporations in Canada (roronto: Butterworths, 1983) 1,
and Chandler, supra, note 24.
28 Cairns, Chandler & Moull, supra, note 4 at 274.
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the proper objectives of governments in relation to resource exploitation
or the appropriate means of reaching those objectives. 29 The industry
was the prime agent for developing resources while the role of the state
was largely facilitative of this private sector activity.
Changes to the symbiotic relationship among federal government,
provincial governments, and private resource developers were already
beginning to become apparent in the 1960s, particularly in the tax reform
debates of that era. Both the Carter Royal Commission on Taxation
and Ontario's Smith Committee on Taxation brought forward proposals
to increase taxation of the exhaustible resource industries. In the 1970s
there was a continuing challenge to the favoured position of the extractive
industries. More generally, no longer was resource policy left as the
exclusive function of clientele-oriented mines and resources departments
comprised largely of technical officials. Resources became matters for
finance ministries and premiers' offices as well. In short, resource matters
became highly politicized.
Conflicts between federal and provincial governments, between
regions, and between the public and private sectors dominated the
decade.30 Increasingly, new interest groups entered the political process
in the 1970s. 31 These interest groups were not only public, but private
as well. No longer was there just the triad of private producers, the
producing provinces, and the federal government seeking a common goal;
consumers, non-producing provincial governments, environmentalists,
banks, et cetera, all began to exert their influence directly or through
new government departments and agencies. As well, the homogeneity
of private producer interests was ruptured. Central Canada Potash, for
instance, acted as a renegade in its legal challenge of potash prorationing.
Its interests differed markedly from those of the other producers (all
of whom, at the time, were private), and it pursued those interests by
attacking a regulatory scheme designed to protect the industry as a whole.
The differences in interest between the major petroleum producers and
the small independent exploration and production firms were also
becoming more readily apparent. Capture of the taxation and regulatory
processes by a single interest group composed of major private-sector
producers was now far less likely than it had been historically. Instead,
29 G. Stevenson, "The Process of Making Mineral Policy in Canada" in C. Beigie & A. Hero,
eds., Natural Resources in U.S.-Canadian Relations (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1980) 167 c. 14.
30 We have described these conflicts at more length in supra, note 4 at 254-263.
31 As a general phenomenon, see A.P. Pross, "Canadian Pressure Groups in the 1970s: Their
Role and their Relations with the Public Service" (1975) 18 Can. Pub. Admin. 121. More specific
to the resource sector, see M. Chandler and W.M. Chandler, "The Path of Resource Development"
in D.C. MacDonald, ed., The Government and Politics of Ontario (Toronto: Nelson, 1985) 362.
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pressures continued for industry to internalize such costs as pollution
and to spread the benefits of development far more widely in society.32
The resource amendment was, in part, the result of the emergence of
these new interests, and it correspondingly affirms the political influence
they will continue to exert. In future, one may expect that private producers
will have continuing but diminished influence in the political process
compared to the practically exclusive access they once had.
The expanded role of government under section 92A would seem
to imply an increase in intervention. This may, or may not, be inescapable;
but the more important change is that the character of intervention has
altered, from protecting the interests of the private producers in a simple,
isolated system to a political and bureaucratic balancing of interests in
a far more interdependent system. There will be a greater sophistication
in the analysis of policy as it affects the natural resource sector of the
economy by the numerous departments and agencies of the provincial
and federal governments. The private producers will have to pursue their
interests in a more competitive (but not necessarily hostile) political
process as the system continues to grope to an equilibrium in the context
of fundamental concerns such as budget deficits and technological change.
To maintain what influence they do have, resource producers may well
have to respond to a range of concerns that they may previously have
considered to be peripheral or even irrelevant.
It is impossible, as yet, to quantify the gains and losses that the
private sector will realize under the resource amendment. What is already
apparent, however, is that section 92A confirms the legitimacy of multiple
interests in the resource policy-making arena. It thus provides an altered
political framework for the development of resource policy. The resource
politics of the eighties will be characterized neither by the industry
dominance of earlier times nor by the pernicious inter-governmental
bickering that spanned the seventies. By providing a stronger legislative
base for resource management by the provinces and by entrenching policy
perspectives beyond those of the industry and the producer provinces,
section 92A makes it very clear that in the eighties governments will
have a greater hand in developing Canada's resources and that the interests
of the industry are not the only ones that will drive policy. A healthy
resource sector is understood to be an important objective of all parties,
but benefits to industry are not the only policy objectives worth pursuing.
32 See D. Yudelman, Canadian Mineral Policy Past and Present The AmbiguousLegacy (Kingston:
Centre for Resource Studies, Queen's University, 1985).
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